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ALASKA’S MERIT SELECTION FOR 
JUDGES 
SUSIE M. DOSIK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In its June 2003 issue, the Alaska Law Review published a note en-
titled “Judicial Selection in Alaska: Justifications and Proposed Courses 
of Reform.”1  In the article, the author, Tillman Finley, outlined the his-
torical debate about judicial selection systems and briefly reviewed 
Alaska’s merit selection system before suggesting that the judicial selec-
tion debate continues to brew in Alaska.2  He assessed the arguments for 
and against merit selection and proposed reforms to address problems he 
perceived with Alaska’s constitutional system.3  That article prompted 
this reply. 
The Finley article contains numerous instances of inaccurate infor-
mation and proposed reforms that, for the most part, are already in place, 
many for over forty years.  This reply identifies and corrects the errors in 
that article, critically assesses its discussion of Alaska’s merit selection 
process, and analyzes its proposed reforms.  This response concludes 
that most of the article’s suggestions are already in place or would not 
help reach Mr. Finley’s stated goal of an accountable judiciary. 
II. THE JUDICIAL SELECTION DEBATE IN ALASKA 
The Finley article begins with a review of the historical underpin-
nings of the debate between merit selection and popular election of 
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 1. Tillman J. Finley, Note, Judicial Selection in Alaska: Justifications and Pro-
posed Courses of Reform, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 49 (2003). 
 2. Id. at 50. 
 3. Id. 
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judges.4  It follows with a discussion of Alaska’s merit system and per-
ceived dissent over the judicial selection process in Alaska.5  The author 
suggested that many Alaskans criticize the current system, and called for 
increased accountability.6  He referred to advocates of increased ac-
countability who point to cases exemplifying an “overly active judici-
ary.”7  Mr. Finley also stated that there is a “growing suspicion and dis-
trust of Alaska’s courts.”8  As the following discussion will show, the 
author greatly exaggerated the degree of dissent in Alaska. 
At the outset, this reply will help set the record straight concerning 
some basic errors in the Finley article.  For example, it states that 
“Alaska weighed these [judicial selection] issues on the eve of statehood 
in 1956,”9 and “Alaska incorporated its method of judicial selection into 
its constitution upon statehood in 1956,”10 suggesting that Alaska be-
came a state in 1956.  Alaska became a state in 1959.11 The author may 
have contemplated Alaska’s Constitutional Convention, which occurred 
from Nov. 8, 1955 to Feb. 6, 1956.12 
Another point to clarify is the article’s statement that “many Alas-
kans believe that the state’s system of judicial selection does not allow 
for enough public input, either through contested judicial elections or 
legislative confirmation of appointed judges.”13  To support this proposi-
tion he cited the “Sponsor Statement” of Senate Joint Resolution 22 
(SJR 22), dated April 4, 2001, proposed by former Alaska State Senator 
Robin Taylor.14  Former State Senator Taylor made no such assertion in 
his Sponsor Statement.15  Instead, through SJR 22, he proposed to 
change the length of judicial terms for retention elections of supreme 
 
 4. Id.. 
 5. Id. at 52–55. 
 6. Id. at 54. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 55. 
 9. Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
 10. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
 11. Exec. Proclamation No. 3269, 3 C.F.R. 4 (1959-1963), reprinted in 48 U.S.C. 
preceding § 21 (2000). 
 12. Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Nov. 8, 1955 – Feb. 6, 
1956), available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/cc_minutes.html (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2004). 
 13. Finley, supra note 1, at 54. 
 14. Id. at 54 n. 34 (citing Senator Robin Taylor, Sponsor Statement for S.J. Res. 22, 
Apr. 4, 2001, available at http://www.akrepublicans.org/pastlegs/22ndleg/spst/spstsjr 
022.shtml (last visited Sept. 2, 2004)). 
 15. Senator Robin Taylor, Sponsor Statement for S.J. Res. 22, Apr. 4, 2001, avail-
able at http://www.akrepublicans.org/pastlegs/22ndleg /spst/spstsjr022.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2004) (advocating for more accountability of judges by having retention elec-
tions more frequently). 
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court justices and superior court judges.16  Nothing in either the Sponsor 
Statement nor the resolution proposed contested judicial elections or leg-
islative confirmation of judges.17 
The author also asserted that “[a]dvocates of increased accountabil-
ity for Alaska’s judges cite a number of cases as examples of an overly 
active judiciary.”18  He did not identify these advocates and cited only 
two cases:19 Area G. Home & Landowners Organization, Inc., v. City of 
Anchorage (HALO)20 and Bess v. Ulmer.21 
The author characterized HALO as a case in which “the Alaska Su-
preme Court interpreted a provision of Anchorage’s municipal charter so 
as to allow the city residents to vote on whether to expand its police ser-
vice area to include a new community (and impose accompanying mu-
nicipal taxes) without affording the residents of the area a separate vote 
on the annexation.”22  Actually, in HALO, the city assembly, a body con-
taining duly elected representatives of the people, had enacted an ordi-
nance allowing the city to expand the police service area by abolishing 
the old one and establishing a new municipal service area that included 
the disputed area.23  The court interpreted language in the city charter 
broadly to permit the assembly’s ordinance and deferred to the assem-
bly’s legislative action to resolve the inequities of having the “new 
community,” which was actually a well-established neighborhood of the 
city, that benefited from police and other services without having to pay 
for them.24  The HALO court acted conservatively to uphold the peoples’ 
and their elected representatives’ votes.  It was not a case in which the 
judiciary could be legitimately characterized as “overly active.”25 
The author next described Bess v. Ulmer as a case in which the 
court “rejected a ballot initiative limiting prisoners’ rights as an inappro-
priate constitutional ‘revision’ and deleted portions of a ballot initiative 
 
 16. S.J. Res. 22, 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001). 
 17. See Sponsor Statement of Senator Robin Taylor, supra note 15; S.J. Res. 22, su-
pra note 16. 
 18. Finley, supra note 1, at 54. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 927 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1996). 
 21. 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999). 
 22. Finley, supra note 1, at 54. 
 23. HALO, 927 P.2d 728 at 729–30. 
 24. See id. at 732–34. 
 25. Mr. Finley also cites the HALO opinion (a 4-1 opinion) as a reason that then-
Chief Justice Fabe was targeted for a negative retention election campaign in 2000. 
Finley, supra note 1, at 66 n.110.  The source for this information is a single letter to the 
editor of the Anchorage Daily News.  Id. (citing Ruth Ewig, Letter to the Editor, “No” 
on Fabe, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov 4, 2000, at 98; also citing Ann Lohrey, Letter 
to the Editor, Get Fabe Off the Bench, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 16, 2000, at 6B). 
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amending the Alaska Constitution to prevent the state from recognizing 
same-sex marriages.”26  He then stated that “[c]ritics often cite these 
cases and others as evidence of the unresponsive nature of the Alaska 
judiciary and the dire need for holding judges accountable for their deci-
sions on the bench.”27 
In Bess v. Ulmer, the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed three ballot 
initiatives to change or clarify the Alaska Constitution: one altering the 
constitutional rights of prisoners, one limiting marriage, and one regard-
ing apportionment.28  The court struck down the prisoners’ rights initia-
tive as amounting to an impermissible constitutional revision.29  The 
court allowed the marriage amendment on the ballot because it was suf-
ficiently limited in its scope.30  The court did, however, strike one sen-
tence of the ballot language as superfluous.31  The court also upheld the 
apportionment initiative.32 
Former State Senator Donley responded to the court’s rulings by in-
troducing Senate Joint Resolution 27 (May 14, 1999), a constitutional 
amendment that would have prevented the court from “rewriting” a bal-
lot initiative.33  That amendment failed.34  Former State Senators Donley 
and Leman also introduced Senate Joint Resolution 15 (SJR 15) in 1999 
in response to Bess v. Ulmer.35  In SJR 15, the senators proposed to 
change the Alaska Constitution to allow more frequent judicial retention 
elections and to give the governor direct power to appoint judges.36  The 
proposed process would have bypassed the Judicial Council’s nomina-
tion of judicial candidates to the governor and would have allowed for 
 
 26. Finley, supra note 1, at 54. 
 27. Id. at 55 (citing Press Release, Alaska Senators Loren Leman and Dave Donley, 
Resolution Proposes Increased Accountability from Judiciary (Mar. 5, 1999) available at 
http://www.akrepublicans.org/preleman103051999.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2001); also 
citing Dave Donley, et al., Bess v. Ulmer – The Supreme Court Stumbles and the 
Subsistence Amendment Falls, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 295 (2002)). 
 28. 985 P.2d 979, 981 (Alaska 1999). 
 29. Id. at 987–88. 
 30. Id. at 988. 
 31. Id. at 988 n.57. 
 32. Id. at 988–89 (representing a substantial change, but not enough to qualify as a 
revision). 
 33. S.J. Res. 27, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999). Mr. Donley also authored an 
article critical of Bess v. Ulmer that appeared in the Alaska Law Review in 2002.  Don-
ley, et al., supra note 27. 
 34. The proposed amendment failed to garner a majority of the electorate needed to 
amend the constitution. ALASKA CONST., art. XIII, § 1. Election results can be found at: 
http://ltgov.state.ak.us/constitution.php?section=amendments (last visited Sept. 29, 
2004). 
 35. Sponsor Statement of Senator Robin Taylor, supra note 15. 
 36. S.J. Res. 15, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999). 
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direct appointment of judges by the governor with legislative confirma-
tion in joint session.37  The Senate Judiciary Committee did not move 
SJR 15 out of committee in time for the end of the legislative session.38  
State Senator Robin Taylor’s proposal in SJR 22 in 2001, discussed 
above, also did not go beyond the committee process.39 
The final source of dissent mentioned by the author was 2001 
Alaska Senate Bill 159, which, as introduced, would have reduced court 
of appeals judges’ terms from eight to four years.40  That bill, also intro-
duced by former State Senator Taylor,41 was not moved from the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.42 
The sources of dissent used by Mr. Finley were press releases and 
sponsor statements for constitutional amendments proposed by former 
State Senators Donley, Taylor, and Leman as well as failed legislative 
proposals.43  The public did not support the proposed constitutional 
amendment that would have restricted court review of ballot initiatives.44  
The legislature did not support proposals that would have altered judicial 
retention systems.45  The lack of public or legislative response to the 
proposals, which were all introduced by the same three individuals, sug-
gests that there was no widespread disagreement with the constitution-
ally established procedure of selecting and retaining judges.  Instead, the 
public appears generally satisfied with the current merit selection proc-
ess. 
Despite its authority to do so in some areas, the legislature has 
passed only minor changes to the judicial selection process in the forty-
five years since statehood.46  Neither the legislature nor the people have 
amended Alaska’s Constitutional provisions regarding judicial selec-
tion.47  This stability in the judicial selection system may be seen as a 
 
 37. Id.  For a discussion of the judicial selection process, see infra, Part III. 
 38. S.J. Res. 15, 21st Leg., 2d Sess. at 2855 (Alaska 2000) (reporting that resolution 
heard and held). 
 39. S.J. Res. 22, 2d Sess. at 1117 (Alaska 2001). 
 40. S. Res. 159, 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2002). 
 41. Id. 
 42. S.J. 22, 2d Sess. at 2679 (Alaska 2001). 
 43. See Finley, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
 44. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 45. See supra notes 40–41, 44 and accompanying text. 
 46. Compare 1959 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 50, §§ 8(2), 23 (setting forth judicial se-
lection process for superior court judges and supreme court justices) with ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 22.05.080, 22.07.070, 22.10.100, 170 (Michie 2002); compare 1980 Alaska Sess. 
Laws ch. 12, §§ 1, 5, 12, 19 with ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.070, 22.07.040, 22.10.090, 
22.15.160 (Michie 2002) (defining qualifications of supreme court justices, and court of 
appeals, superior court, and district court judges). 
 47. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
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legislative and public endorsement of the system established by the 
framers of the Alaska Constitution. 
To help those readers interested in the debate on judicial selection 
attain a fuller and more precise understanding of Alaska’s current merit 
selection system, the next section of this article provides a comprehen-
sive and accurate overview of the system’s mechanics. 
III. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN ALASKA 
Alaska selects judges through a merit selection process involving 
all three branches of state government as well as the Alaska Judicial 
Council (the “Council”), an independent citizens’ commission chaired 
by the Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court.  While the legislature 
establishes most judicial positions and qualifications, the Council evalu-
ates applicants and nominates the most qualified.  The governor then ap-
points one of the nominees. 
A. The Legislature’s Role 
In Alaska, the legislature may establish statutory courts in addition 
to the constitutionally required supreme and superior courts.48  Accord-
ingly, it established the district court in 196649 and a criminal court of 
appeals in 1979.50  With newly established courts come judicial positions 
to be filled.51  The legislature establishes how many judges sit, both in 
courts it establishes and in the constitutionally-based superior court.52  
The legislature also directs how many judges will sit in each judicial dis-
trict,53 and sometimes specifies that a new judge shall sit on a particular 
court.54  The legislature has also established judicial positions for spe-
cific purposes, such as for a “therapeutic” or problem-solving court.55 
The legislature also sets forth how judicial positions are to be filled 
for the statutorily created courts.56  For both the district court and the 
criminal court of appeals it adopted the same procedures that the Alaska 
 
 48. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The judicial power of the State is vested in a su-
preme court, a superior court, and the courts established by the legislature.”). 
 49. 1966 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 24, § 2; ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.010 (Michie 2002). 
 50. ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.010 (Michie 2002). 
 51. See id. §§ 22.15.010, 22.15.020 (establishing a district court and assigning an 
initial cohort of judges and magistrates for each judicial district). 
 52. Id. §§ 22.07.010, 22.10.120, 22.15.020. 
 53. Id. §§ 22.10.120, 22.15.020. 
 54. E.g., 2001 Alaska Sess. Laws 64 (directing that there be a new superior court 
judge in Palmer, Alaska). 
 55. 2001 Alaska Sess. Laws 64 (directing that there be a new superior court judge in 
Anchorage, Alaska to sit on the newly created “Felony DWI court.”). 
 56. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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Constitution established for the selection of supreme court justices and 
for superior court judges.57 
Additionally, the legislature establishes qualifications for judicial 
positions at all levels.58  The legislature requires that judges be of a 
minimum age, be residents of the state for various periods of time, have 
been engaged in the “active practice” of law, and be licensed to practice 
law in the state.59 
Last, and the only area of influence mentioned by Mr. Finley,60 the 
legislature confirms the governor’s appointment of the Council’s three 
lay members.61  Non-attorney members are appointed by the governor, 
who then must be confirmed by a majority of the members of the legisla-
ture in joint session.62  As is true for attorney members, Council non-
attorney appointments must be made with due consideration to area rep-
resentation.63 
Mr. Finley’s article states that the legislature has an “almost non-
existent role in judicial selection.”64  He argued that “the legislature’s 
only participation in the judicial selection process comes in the form of 
voting to confirm the governor’s nominations to fill the three layperson 
positions on the Alaska Judicial Council.”65  In fact, as outlined above, 
the legislature performs several indispensable roles in the judicial selec-
tion process.66 
The importance of the legislature’s role in the judicial selection 
process should not be minimized.  Although the legislature has no role in 
the selection of an individual for a particular judicial position, its actions 
are critical to the proper functioning of the courts and to the delivery of 
justice in Alaska.  As discussed above, only the legislature, as advised 
by the courts, can consider the needs of the people and determine when 
and where new courts and judges are necessary.67  Only the legislature 
may determine how judges of statutorily-created courts are selected and 
 
 57. ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.07.070, 22.15.170 (Michie 2002). 
 58. Id. §§ 22.05.070, 22.07.040, 22.10.090, 22.15.160. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Finley, supra note 1, at 73 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8). 
 61. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5, 8. 
 62. Id. art. IV, § 8. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Finley, supra note 1, at 73 (citing S.J. Res 15, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 
1999); also citing Press Release, Alaska Senators Loren Leman and Dave Donley, 
Resolution Proposes Increased Accountability from Judiciary (Mar. 5, 1999) available at 
http://www.akrepublicans.org/preleman103051999.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2001)). 
 65. Finley, supra note 1, at 73 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8). 
 66. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5, 8. 
 67. Id. art. IV, §1 (specifying that jurisdiction and judicial districts are determined 
by the legislature). 
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establish minimum qualifications for sitting judges.68  If the legislature 
did not have a role in judicial selection, there would be few judges to se-
lect and no standards for selecting them. 
Critics like Mr. Finley often overlook the legislature’s role in judi-
cial selection and retention processes.69  Minimizing the legislative role 
allows critics to suggest that there is a power imbalance that should be 
corrected.70  In fact, the duties and responsibilities of judicial selection 
are divided among the three branches of government and the Judicial 
Council, minimizing the opportunity for any one entity to dominate the 
process.71 
B. The Alaska Judicial Council’s Role 
1. Council Membership.  The Judicial Council is comprised of 
three attorney members, three non-attorney members, and the Chief Jus-
tice of the Alaska Supreme Court.72  The method of appointing each 
Council class varies.  The governor appoints the non-attorney members 
for staggered, six-year terms, and the legislature confirms them.73  Typi-
cally, the non-attorney members are appointed with “due consideration” 
for geographic representation.74 
Similarly, the attorney members are appointed by the Alaska Bar 
Association with due consideration to geographic representation.75  Gen-
erally, one Judicial Council attorney member represents the First Judicial 
District from Southeast Alaska, one member represents the Third Judi-
cial District from South Central Alaska, and one member represents the 
Second and Fourth Judicial Districts from Interior, Western, or Northern 
Alaska.76  Bar members from the applicable judicial district notify the 
bar of their interest in candidacy, and members from that judicial district 
then vote for their preferred nominee.77  The Alaska Bar Association’s 
Board of Governors then votes on whether to appoint the nominee to the 
 
 68. ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.070, 22.07.040, 22.10.090, 22.15.160 (Michie 2002). 
 69. See Finley, supra note 1, at 73 (arguing that many members of the legislature 
feel that they play too limited a role in judicial selection in their capacity confirming the 
governor’s selections to the Alaska Judicial Council). 
 70. See id. (discussing options for increasing legislative participation in judicial se-
lection). 
 71. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 5. 
 72. Id. art. IV, § 8. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Email from Steve Van Goor, Bar Counsel, Alaska Bar Association, to Susie Ma-
son Dosik, Staff Attorney, Alaska Judicial Council (Aug. 30, 2004) (on file with author). 
 77. Id. 
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Council.78  The attorney members are also appointed for staggered six-
year terms.79 
The Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court is a member of the 
Council ex-officio and serves as its chair.80  A supreme court justice’s 
term as Chief Justice, and as a member of the Council, is limited to three 
consecutive years, although he or she may serve additional non-
consecutive terms.81 
2. The Judicial Council’s Nomination Process.  The merit selec-
tion process for a particular judicial office begins when a vacancy oc-
curs, either when the legislature has created a new position, or a sitting 
judge has left or is planning to leave the bench.82  The Judicial Council 
notifies all active Alaska Bar Association members of the vacancy and 
invites applications from all qualified members of the bar.83  Council by-
laws allow Council members to encourage specific persons to submit 
applications and to cooperate with judicial selection committees of state 
or local bar associations.84 
Interested attorneys complete the Council’s application form.85  The 
application requests information about the attorney’s background, in-
cluding: education, employment history, military record, potential con-
flicts of interest, prior professional discipline, criminal history, commu-
nity ties, and recent court or other legal experience.86  The applicant also 
sends a representative legal writing sample so that the Council can as-
sess the candidate’s legal reasoning and writing abilities.87 
After the application deadline has passed, Council staff sends a ju-
dicial qualifications survey to every active member of the state bar.88  
 
 78. Id. 
 79. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. art. IV, § 2(b). 
 82. See, e.g., Position Announcement Letter from Alaska Judicial Council to Alaska 
Bar Association Members for Anchorage Superior Court (March 15, 2004) (announcing 
vacancy due to retirement of Superior Court Judge John Reese) (on file with the Alaska 
Judicial Council); Position Announcement Letter from Alaska Judicial Council to Alaska 
Bar Association Members for Kenai District Court (June 4, 2002) (announcing vacancy 
due to creation of judgeship by legislature) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council). 
 83. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. VIII, § 1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. art. VIII, § 2. 
 86. Alaska Judicial Council, Application for Judicial Appointment, available at 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Selection/Application.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2004). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Alaska Judicial Council, Application Procedures, available at http://www.ajc. 
state.ak.us/selection/procedur.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2004). 
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The survey is conducted entirely by independent contractors.89  On the 
survey, attorneys give information about their level of knowledge of 
each candidate and rate each candidate’s professional competence, integ-
rity, judicial temperament, fairness, relevant experience, and overall pro-
fessional performance.90  The survey also asks for general comments 
about each candidate’s legal ability, comportment, diligence, or suitable 
experience, and any other information that would help the Council in its 
evaluation.91 
Meanwhile, Council staff performs background checks (using ap-
plicant waivers for the information) on professional discipline, credit, 
civil litigation (as a party), criminal history, and driving records.92  
Council staff also sends questionnaires to attorneys with whom the can-
didate has recently worked asking for information on legal abilities, dili-
gence, and other relevant factors, and solicits letters of reference from 
people whom the candidate has identified.93  Last, the Council invites the 
public to comment through press releases and its website.94  The Council 
uses any information it obtains only to evaluate each applicant’s fitness 
for office.95 
The Council next interviews each candidate at a meeting, usually 
held in the location of the judgeship.96  The candidate decides whether 
the interview will be public or private.97  Afterwards, Council members 
discuss each candidate’s qualifications and relative merits.98  The Coun-
cil also holds a public hearing to solicit additional comments about the 
candidates.99  Council members then vote publicly on which candidates 
to nominate.100 
The philosophy that the framers of the Alaska Constitution ex-
pressed during the Constitutional Convention101 evolved into a Council 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TWENTY-FIRST REP. TO THE LEGISLATURE AND SUP. 
CT. app. D, at D-2 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter TWENTY-FIRST REP.]. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at D-3. 
 93. Id. at D-2. 
 94. See, e.g., Press Release, Alaska Judicial Council (June 17, 2004) (inviting public 
comment) (on file at Judicial Council); Alaska Judicial Council, Comment and Feedback 
Form, available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/General/feedbackgeneral.htm (inviting 
general feedback from the public) (last visited Sept. 5, 2004). 
 95. TWENTY-FIRST REP., supra note 90, at D-3. 
 96. Id. at D-5. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at D-6. 
 100. Id. at D-5 to D-6. 
 101. See Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes Concerning Judicial Selection 
and Retention, 594 (1956), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/General/akccon.htm 
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policy of nominating the “most qualified” candidates for gubernatorial 
appointment.102  Council bylaws state: 
The Judicial Council shall endeavor to nominate for judicial office 
and for public defender those judges and members of the bar whose 
character, temperament, legal ability and legal experience are demon-
strated to be of the highest quality.  The Council shall actively en-
courage qualified members of the bar to seek nomination to such of-
fices, and shall endeavor to prevent political considerations from 
outweighing fitness in the judicial and public defender nomination 
processes.103 
Council members therefore interpret their responsibility as nominating 
only the “most qualified” and fittest of the candidates rather than those 
who are merely statutorily qualified.104 
Political affiliation is not evaluated in the judicial selection proc-
ess.105  The Council has never imposed any sort of litmus test to vet a 
candidate’s political views and does not inquire into a candidate’s views 
on controversial political subjects.106  If political issues arise, the Coun-
cil asks whether the candidate, if appointed, could remain objective and 
make rulings contrary to his or her own views if the law required.107 
Despite the different backgrounds and appointment methods of the 
attorney and non-attorney Council members, both consistently vote to 
nominate the same applicants.108  This agreement is likely due to the use 
of objective criteria and to the “most qualified” judicial selection phi-
losophy, suggesting that the Council nominates candidates based on 
merit rather than politics.  Council members do not view their role in 
 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes]. 
 102. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. VIII, § 4. 
 103. Id. art. I, § 1. 
 104. This philosophy evolved from views expressed by framers of the Alaska Consti-
tution.  See Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes, supra note 101, at 594 (1956) 
(stating that the Judicial Council should “seek for the best available” candidates).  This 
philosophy was further discussed at an Alaska Bar Association “Off the Record” con-
tinuing legal education program in December 2001. An audiotape of the program is 
available through the Alaska Judicial Council or the Alaska Bar Association.  Alaska Bar 
Association CLE #2002-027. 
 105. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE: A PROFILE OF 
ALASKA’S JUDICIAL APPLICANTS AND JUDGES 6 (May 1999) [hereinafter FOSTERING 
JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE]. 
 106.  Alaska Bar Association CLE #2002-027, supra note 104. 
 107.  Id. 
 108. Memorandum from the Alaska Judicial Council staff, to Larry Cohn, Executive 
Director, Alaska Judicial Council, 1–2 (Sept. 8, 2004) (on file with the Alaska Judicial 
Council). 
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nominating judicial candidates as political, in contrast to the governor’s 
inherently political role.109 
C. The Executive’s Role 
The governor has two crucial roles to play in the selection process: 
the appointment of judges110 and the appointment of non-attorney Coun-
cil members.111  Council members serve staggered, six-year terms and 
therefore may remain on the Council longer than the governor serves in 
office.112  Hence, the governor’s influence on the Council may outlast 
his term. 
After the Council nominates candidates, it conveys those nomina-
tions to the governor.113  The Council sends each nominee’s application 
and all unsolicited comments and letters that it received during the 
nomination process to the governor for review.114  The governor must 
make judicial appointments within forty-five days after receiving the 
Council’s nominations.115 
D. The Public’s Role 
The public has the opportunity to play a substantial role in judicial 
selection.  At each point in the nomination process, the Council issues 
press releases with brief biographies of each applicant, notice of the Bar 
survey scores, and names of the Council’s nominees.116  The Council 
also provides opportunities for the public to comment on judicial candi-
dates by sending an electronic comment through e-mail or the Council 
website,117 writing directly to the Council, speaking directly with a 
Council member,118 or testifying at a public hearing.119 
 
 109. Alaska Bar Association CLE #2002-027, supra note 104. 
 110. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
 111. Id. § 8. 
 112. See id. 
 113. TWENTY-FIRST REP., supra note 90, at D-6. 
 114. Id. 
 115. ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.080(a) (Supreme Court), 22.07.070(a) (Court of Ap-
peals), 22.10.100(a) (Superior Court), 22.15.170(a) (District Court) (Michie 2002). 
 116. See, e.g., Press Release, Alaska Judicial Council, Anchorage Superior Court, 
Third Judicial District 1–2 (Apr. 9, 2004) (listing applicants and inviting public com-
ment); Press Release, Alaska Judicial Council Bar Survey, Anchorage Superior Court, 
Third Judicial District 1–3 (June 17, 2004) (reporting bar survey scores, inviting public 
comment and announcing public hearing); Press Release, Alaska Judicial Council An-
chorage Superior Court Vacancy, Third Judicial District 1–2 (Aug. 10, 2004) (listing the 
Council’s nominees) (all on file with Alaska Judicial Council). 
 117. See Alaska Judicial Council, Comment and Feedback Form, supra note 94. 
 118. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. X, § 2 (describing procedures to be 
followed upon receipt of such information). 
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Public comment may have three effects.  First, Council staff and 
members may consider the comment and may conduct more investiga-
tion. Second, comments may influence Council votes.  Last, all com-
ments not directly solicited by the Council that are not confidential are 
considered public record and are sent to the governor with the nominees’ 
applications.120 
The public may also contact the governor directly to try to influ-
ence the appointment.121  Any potential that this creates for “political in-
fluence” is tempered by the fact that all of the nominees considered by 
the governor were in the “most qualified” group of applicants presented 
by the Council. 
IV. RESPONSES TO THE FINLEY ARTICLE’S  
CRITICISMS OF MERIT SELECTION 
A. Responses to Criticisms of Alaska’s Judicial Selection Process 
The Finley article states: “The attorneys who are appointed to the 
[C]ouncil owe their positions to the governing powers in the Alaska bar 
and will almost surely represent the views of the state’s most powerful 
and successful lawyers.”122  The article suggests that attorney Council 
members should be elected by the entire Alaska bar rather than ap-
pointed by the Board of Governors.123  But the Bar membership has ef-
fectively elected attorney Council members for over forty years; its advi-
sory vote has never been rejected.124 
The Finley article states that “[n]either Alaska law nor Council by-
laws provide specific criteria by which judicial applicants and judges up 
for retention should be evaluated.”125  Regarding judicial selection crite-
ria, Alaska law sets minimum qualifications for judicial applicants: the 
active practice of law for a prescribed period immediately before ap-
 
 119. FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 105, at 9. 
 120. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. XI, §§ 1–2 (declaring that a source of 
unsolicited communication may request that the communication remain confidential); 
TWENTY-FIRST REP., supra note 90, at D-4. 
 121. Cf. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. X, § 3 (allowing sitting Council 
members to provide such personal recommendations or opinions). 
 122. Finley, supra note 1, at 72. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Email from Steve Van Goor, supra note 76 (stating that although the Board 
of Governors retains discretion to appoint any bar member to the Council, it historically 
has appointed the bar member with the highest number of votes) (on file with author). 
 125. Finley, supra note 1, at 65 (citing FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 
105, at 11). 
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pointment, citizenship, Alaska residency, and a license to practice law.126  
Beyond these minimum requirements, the Alaska Constitution provides 
that the Judicial Council shall act “according to rules which it adopts.”127 
Accordingly, Article I, Section 1 of the Judicial Council Bylaws states 
that members “shall endeavor to nominate for judicial office and for 
public defender those judges and members of the bar whose character, 
temperament, legal ability and legal experience are demonstrated to be 
of the highest quality.”128 Those bylaws also mandate the Council to 
“carefully consider whether or not each person under consideration pos-
sesses the qualities prescribed in Article I, Section 1, hereof, and shall 
determine whether each such person is so qualified.”129  Published 
guidelines to judicial applicants establish that judicial candidates are 
evaluated using six criteria that reflect the qualities set forth in Article I, 
Section 1: professional competence, integrity, judicial temperament, fair-
ness, relevant experience, and overall professional performance.130  All 
of these criteria are reproduced in publicly available Judicial Council 
publications. 
With regard to Alaska law concerning the evaluation of judges up 
for reelection, the legislature has deferred to the Judicial Council regard-
ing how it assesses judges.131  As a result, the Judicial Council Bylaws 
direct that the Council “conduct evaluations of the qualifications and 
performance of such justices and judges and shall make the results of 
such evaluations public.”132  Again, the Council’s criteria are: fairness, 
legal ability, temperament, and overall professional performance, includ-
ing diligence and administrative skills.133  Thus, the “qualifications” for 
recommendation for retention remain those stated in Article I, Section 1 
of the Council bylaws.134 
Mr. Finley also stated that “[p]erhaps the strongest criticism of re-
tention elections is that they do not effectively take interest and issue 
 
 126. ALASKA STAT. §§22.05.070 (Supreme Court), 22.07.040 (Court of Appeals), 
22.10.090 (Superior Court), 22.15.160(a) (District Court) (Michie 2002). 
 127. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
 128. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 129. Id. art. VIII, § 4. 
 130. See Alaska Judicial Council Judicial Selection Procedures, available at 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/selection/procedur.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
 131. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.58.050, 22.05.100, 22.07.060, 22.10.150, 22.15.195 (Mi-
chie 2002) (requiring the Judicial Council to submit judge evaluations and recommenda-
tions, at every level of the state judicial system, to the state lieutenant governor). 
 132. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. IX, § 1. 
 133. See Alaska Judicial Council, Evaluation/Retention Procedures, available at 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retent.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). 
 134. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. I, § 1. 
DOSIK.DOC 12/9/2004  11:50 AM 
2004] REPLY: JUDICIAL SELECTION 319 
politics out of the judicial selection process[.]”135  This may be true, but 
Mr. Finley’s comment misses the point.  If the voters perceive that issue 
and interest politics have been a part of the judicial selection process, 
they have the opportunity to reject those politics at the polls. 
In order to increase public awareness of the judicial selection proc-
ess, Mr. Finley suggested that the Council make candidate interviews 
and other information about the selection process accessible to the media 
and the public.136  Such a suggestion must be tempered by the reality that 
the Council conducts extensive background checks that may reveal very 
private information.137  Therefore, candidate interviews are generally not 
open to the public so as to protect the privacy of the candidate and the 
integrity of the selection process.138  Candidates do, however, have the 
option to make their interviews open to the public.139  Furthermore, once 
a candidate is appointed to a judgeship, he or she becomes subject to the 
same financial disclosures required of all public office holders.140 
The Finley article suggests that Council members adopt a code of 
conduct, listing specific “do’s” and “do not’s,” including a rule that 
would prohibit Council members from discussing their work with non-
Council members, and one proscribing Council members from employ-
ing a “litmus test” to evaluate candidates.141  Fortunately, the Council’s 
bylaws already contain most of these proposed conduct rules, including: 
policies “Concerning Selection of Justices, Judges, and Public Defend-
ers,”142 conflicts of interest,143 selection procedures,144 and confidential-
ity.145  Additionally, Council members are considered to be “public offi-
 
 135. Finley, supra note 1, at 71. 
 136. Finley, supra note 1, at 76. 
 137. See infra text accompanying note 92. 
 138. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. VIII, § 3(C). 
 139.  Id. 
 140. ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.110 (Michie 2002) (requiring judicial officers to file re-
ports of financial and business interests). 
 141. Finley, supra note 1, at 75. 
 142. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. I, § 1. 
 143.  Id. art. V, § 2 (requiring Council members to disqualify themselves from dis-
cussing or voting on any matter in which they have a substantial personal or pecuniary 
interest). 
 144. Id. art. VIII, §4 (requiring Council members to carefully consider whether each 
candidate possesses the highest quality character, temperament, legal ability, and legal 
experience). 
 145.  Id. art. XI, §3 (stating that materials that are part of the deliberative process 
should remain confidential when “their disclosure would cause substantial and adverse 
effects to the Council that outweigh the need for access”). 
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cials,”146 and as such are prohibited by law from using their position to 
obtain financial gain.147 
Mr. Finley also expressed concern that Alaska’s merit selection sys-
tem results in under-representation of minorities and women on the 
bench. 148  As support, he mistakenly observed that, in Alaska, of the 
forty-one sitting judges, only two were minorities and nine were women, 
and all but one of those judges were at the superior court level. 149  When 
he wrote his article in 2003, he apparently used 2001 data that did not 
include any data on district court judges.150  At that time there were fifty-
eight sitting judges in Alaska;151 fourteen were women, including: six 
district court judges, seven superior court judges, and the Chief Justice 
of the Alaska Supreme Court.152  In 2003, there were sixty-two judges, 
thirteen of whom were women, including five district court judges, 
seven superior court judges, and a justice of the Alaska Supreme 
Court.153  Alaska Judicial Council data show that women are currently 
nominated by the Council in proportion to the numbers who apply, and 
minorities are nominated at a slightly higher rate.154 
The Judicial Council represents both the Bar and the public, with 
members from both sectors.155  It is responsive to the public and con-
tinually seeks public comment and public input on judicial selection.156  
Members are bound by the ethical guidelines for all public officials and 
by those it has imposed on itself.157 
 
 146. ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.200(b)(15) (Michie 2002). 
 147. Id. § 39.50.090(a). 
 148. Finley, supra note 1, at 67. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id.  There Mr. Finley cited American Judicature Society, “Judicial Selection 
in the States,” http://www.ajs.org/js/AK.htm, which is inaccurate.  The cite should have 
been http://www.ajs.org/js/AK_diversity.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).  The diversity 
information cited was derived from AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE DIRECTORY OF 
MINORITY JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 2001).  No source was given for gender 
data. 
 151. Alaska Court System, 2001 Annual Report 5–6, 8, 12–15, 18–19. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Alaska Court System, 2003 Annual Report, 5–6, 8, 12–15, 18–19. 
 154. FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 105, at 37. 
 155. See supra part III-B. 
 156. See supra part III-D. 
 157. See ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.090 (Michie 2002); see also ALASKA JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL BYLAWS art. V, § 2. 
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B. Response to Criticisms of Merit Selection in General and Their Ap-
plication to Alaska’s Judicial Selection Process 
In addition to Alaska-specific concerns, Mr. Finley expressed con-
cern about merit selection generally.158  He contended that, rather than 
taking the politics out of judicial selection, merit selection merely 
changes which politics are involved and can render the process secretive, 
undemocratic, too political, and not accountable or responsive to the 
public.159  He also argued that the merit system cannot eliminate the pos-
sibility for “subtler and more corrupting political influences, including 
money, cronyism, and political activism” and that “[t]he limited number 
of people involved in merit systems like Alaska’s actually increases the 
potential for secretive deals and private collaboration.”160  These general 
concerns are not warranted, given the facts about Alaska’s selection sys-
tem. 
In Alaska, the merit selection process is open and responsive to the 
public.161  Those portions of judicial applications which do not contain 
sensitive personal information are public records.162  All Council meet-
ings are open to the public.163  The Council holds public hearings164 and 
solicits views on the candidates’ character, integrity and ability.165  
Council publications and instructions to judicial applicants are available 
free of charge from the Council office and from its website.166  In addi-
tion, the Council submits a biennial report to the Alaska Legislature that 
explains the judicial selection process in detail.167 
The framers of the Alaska Constitution intended the judicial selec-
tion process to be based on merit with political components.168  Guber-
natorial appointment, by its nature, is a political choice169 inherently re-
sponsive to public pressure.  Merit selection was designed to prevent the 
 
 158. Finley, supra note 1, at 59–63. 
 159. Id. at 60 (citing Honorable Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-Partisan Court 
Plan: A Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-legal En-
vironment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 341 (1997)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See supra part III-D. 
 162. ALASKA STAT. §§ 40.21.150(6), 40.25.110, 40.25.220(3) (Michie 2002); 
ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. XI, § 1. 
 163. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. IV, § 1. 
 164. See supra part III-D. 
 165. See id. 
 166. The Council website can be found at: http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/ (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2004). 
 167. E.g., TWENTY-FIRST REP., supra note 90, at app. D. 
 168. See generally, Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes, supra note 101. 
 169. See id. at 584. 
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politics of appointment from overriding important qualification crite-
ria.170 
Mr. Finley cited a Missouri incident to bolster his argument that po-
litical machinations remain inherent in merit selection systems.171  In 
that incident, the state’s judicial nominating commission provided then-
Governor John Ashcroft with a list of three nominees to fill a vacancy on 
the Missouri Supreme Court.172  Governor Ashcroft appointed his thirty-
three year-old chief-of-staff, who had no judicial experience, passing 
over two experienced appellate judge nominees.173  However, the Finley 
article, its cited source, and its cited source fail to adequately describe 
the nomination process.174  The article merely reports that the commis-
sion and the governor “allegedly collaborated” to manipulate the proc-
ess.175 
There was no evidence cited in the Missouri case that the former 
chief-of-staff was unqualified.176  Neither the Finley article nor its 
sources relate the relevant history.  The governor’s final appointment is 
designed to be a political decision, both in Alaska and in Missouri.  
Whether the balance between having a qualified candidate and one po-
litically acceptable, or preferred, by the governor was met in that case is 
not knowable from the information that the Finley article provides or 
from the sources cited. 
This type of collaboration is highly unlikely to occur in Alaska.  
The “most qualified” policy is designed to protect against a situation in 
which an applicant’s political associations are ever considered in the 
Council’s nomination process.177  As a result, even politically-connected 
nominees will be highly qualified candidates for a judgeship. 
Because of its policy to nominate only those candidates who are 
“most qualified,” the Council and Alaska governors have been, at times, 
at odds.  In one publicly known incident, Governor Hickel asked for 
more nominees than the Council had approved.178  The Council declined 
to provide more nominees179 and further responded by amending its by-
 
 170. See id. at 598–99. 
 171.  Finley, supra note 1, at 60 (citing Daugherty, supra note 159, at 328). 
 172. Gregory Casey, Public Perception of Judicial Scandal: The Missouri Supreme 
Court 1982-88, 13 JUST. SYS. J. 284, 289 (1988-89). 
 173. Id. at 289–90. 
 174. Finley, supra note 1, at 60; Daugherty, supra note 159, at 328. 
 175. Finley, supra note 1, at 60 (citing Daugherty, supra note 159, at 328). 
 176. See Daugherty, supra note 159. 
 177. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. I, § 1; Alaska Bar Association CLE 
#2002-027, supra note 104. 
 178. Letter from Honorable Walter J. Hickel, Governor, State of Alaska, to Alaska 
Judicial Council (Aug. 4, 1993) (on file with Alaska Judicial Council). 
 179. Letter from Alaska Judicial Council, to Honorable Walter J. Hickel, Governor, 
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laws to state that it will not provide more names to the governor even if 
particularly asked.180 
In August 2004, the Governor of Alaska, Frank Murkowski, wrote 
the Judicial Council a brief letter stating that he was rejecting its recent 
nominees for a superior court seat in Anchorage.181  Six days later, a 
public interest group responded by filing a lawsuit against him to compel 
an appointment.182  The public responded to the governor’s action by 
writing numerous opinion pieces and letters to the editor, most of which 
supported the current selection process.183  A few opinion articles and 
 
State of Alaska (Aug. 11, 1993) (on file with Alaska Judicial Council). 
 180. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL BYLAWS art. VIII, § 5. 
 181. Letter from Frank Murkowski, Governor of Alaska, to Larry Cohn, Executive 
Director, Alaska Judicial Council (August 26, 2004) (on file with Alaska Judicial Coun-
cil). 
 182. Alaska Public Interest Research Group v. Murkowski, 3AN-04-10618 CI 
(Alaska Superior Court 2004). 
 183. See, e.g., Andrew Halcro, Hey, Hands Off State Judiciary Branch, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 2004, at F2; Thomas B. Stewart, Judicial Merit 
System Best for Alaskans, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 26, 2004, at F-2; Bryan 
Doughty, Letter to the Editor, Governor’s Run Around Constitution is Power 
Grab and Snub of State Law, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2004, at B-8; 
Kevin F. McCoy, Letter to the Editor, Judge Lisa? Think About It, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2004, at B-8; Matthew W. Claman, Letter to the Editor, 
Before Clark and Governor Criticize Process, They Should Get Facts Right, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 22, 2004, at B-8; Caleb Stewart, Letter to the 
Editor, Writer Critical of Judicial Process Should Practice What He Preaches, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 21, 2004, at B-8; Joy Berger, Letter to the Edi-
tor, One Murkowski Reneged on Pledges the Other Abandoned Office She Won, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 21, 2004, at B-6; Patrick Von Gemmigen, Letter 
to the Editor, Governor Should Seek to Open Caucuses if He Wants Transparency, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004, at B-6; Erik Heiker, Letter to the Edi-
tor, Process for Selecting Judges Should be More Open to Scrutiny, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 20, 2004, at B-6; Kim Elton, Governor Must First Jump the 
Hurdles, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 17, 2004, at B-6; Kevin Clarkson, Truth 
Lies in Middle on Judge Selection, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, at B-
6; Allison Mendel, Way We Pick Judges Now Avoids Pitfalls, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, at B-6; Shawn Roberts, Letter to the Editor, Murkowski is 
Trying to Twist the Rules to Get What He Wants, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 
15, 2004, at B-8; Timothy Weidensee, Letter to the Editor, Council Gave List of 
Most Qualified; Governor Should Choose from It, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 15, 2004, at B-8; Frank Pratt Jr., Letter to the Editor, Judicial Council 
Shouldn’t Give in to Murkowski Bullying on Judge List, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Sept. 14, 2004, at B-6; Jessica Carey Graham, Letter to the Editor, 
Murkowski Slapped Alaskans in the Face by Rejecting Judicial Applicants, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 11, 2004, at B-6; Raymond Wilson, Letter to the 
Editor, Corrupt Legislators Have Lost; Next on the List is Princess Lisa, 
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letters supported the governor’s position.184  The Alaska Bar Association 
Board of Governors responded to the Governor’s action by passing a 
resolution that supported merit selection and that called for an appoint-
ment of one of the nominees.185  In September 2004, the governor ap-
pointed one of the nominees.186  This recent controversy again demon-
strated that, while some critics would like to alter Alaska’s judicial 
selection process, the public is generally satisfied with it. 
Rather than demonstrating a potential for collaboration between the 
governor and the Council, these incidents demonstrate a state of tension 
between the governor and the Council.  This tension naturally results 
from a governor’s wish for a politically preferable candidate to keep his 
constituents satisfied and the Council’s duty to provide the governor 
with only the “most qualified” candidates. This tension demonstrates 
that the merit selection process is working exactly as it should in Alaska. 
The Finley article expresses concern regarding the political aspects 
of judicial appointments but fails to consider that judicial decisionmak-
ing is carefully insulated from political influence because of the merit 
selection system.  Once appointed, Alaska judges are not beholden to the 
pleasure of the one who appointed them.  They do not have to campaign 
for office against opponents, further protecting them from political influ-
ence.  Instead judges stand for retention election; a nonpartisan “yes” or 
“no” vote decides whether they should stay in office.187 
The Finley article argues that the problems associated with 
Alaska’s merit selection system may be compounded by a “lack of pub-
lic knowledge of and interest in judicial [retention] races,”188 despite the 
fact that Alaska is a “national leader in providing voter information.”189  
The article seems concerned mainly that Alaska voters are unaware of or 
 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 10, 2004, at B-6. 
 184.  See James Clark, Appointment Process Needs Review, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 13, 2004, at B-4; James Clark, Letter to the Editor, Judicial 
Appointment Process Must be Made Transparent, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 12, 2004, at H-4; Kristina Johannes, Letter to the Editor, Alaska Needs a 
Constitutional Amendment Defining Judiciary’s Role, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 11, 2004; Judicial Standoff, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Sept. 10, 2004, 
available at http://www.news-miner.com/cda/article/print/0,1674,113%7E7252% 
7E239294,00.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2004). 
 185.  Board of Governors, Alaska Bar Association, Board of Governors Resolution 
Regarding the Judicial Selection Process (Sept. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.alaskabar.org/index.cfm?id=5853 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). 
 186.  Sheila Toomey, Governor Fills Empty Judge Seat, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
Sept. 22, 2004, at B-1. 
 187. ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.100 (Supreme Court), 22.07.060 (Court of Appeals), 
22.10.150 (Superior Court), 22.15.195 (District Court) (Michie 2002). 
 188. Finley, supra note 1, at 60. 
 189. Id. at 61. 
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do not use the information provided to them by the Council.190  It notes 
that voters generally retain judges “due more to the lack of an apparent 
reason to vote the judge out, than for any affirmative reason to reward 
the judge with another term.”191  Thus his post-appointment concern 
with Alaska’s merit selection system, apparently, is that it is not political 
enough whereas his concern at the appointment stage was that it was too 
political.  If the goal is to protect judicial decision-making from im-
proper influence, the protections should be effective when the judge is 
actually making those decisions – while he or she is holding the office. 
The Finley article seems to suggest that some judges should be 
“rewarded” with another term,192 implying that others should be “pun-
ished” by being voted out.  This model is the antithesis of merit selection 
and retention where candidates are evaluated not by their decisions in 
office, or by their campaign promises on how they will rule, but on their 
qualifications and fitness for office. 
Although issue and interest politics are never absent from an elec-
toral process, Alaska’s retention election process minimizes their influ-
ence.  Since statehood, Alaskan voters have removed only three judges 
from office.193  From 1984 to 1998, the percentage of voters who voted 
to retain all judges in office ranged from 64-71%.194  Although several 
groups campaigned against judges in recent elections,195 they did not 
persuade the electorate to vote any judges out of office.196  Some critics 
of the merit selection system see the high retention rates as a sign of an 
ineffective accountability mechanism,197 but supporters believe that high 
retention rates indicate that the judicial selection system produces excel-
lent judges.198 
C. Response to a Call for Accountability 
After a weighing of the pros and cons of the merit selection proc-
ess, the Finley article states, “[w]hile Alaska’s system of judicial reten-
tion may provide for a degree of accountability, its system of judicial se-
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 60 (citing Honorable B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hanson, Judicial 
Retention Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1429, 1437 (1997)). 
 192. See id. 
 193. See FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 105, at 14 n.36; TWENTY-
FIRST REP., supra note 90, at app. F. 
 194. FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 105, at 19, tbl. 1. 
 195. Id. at 14. 
 196. Id. at 19. 
 197. See Finley, supra note 1, at 63 (stating that retention elections’ attempt to hold 
judges accountable is a façade when there is little public interest). 
 198. FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 105, at 69. 
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lection is notably lacking in that respect.”199  It concludes that Alaska’s 
selection system would benefit from increased accountability.200  To that 
end, the article suggests that each member of the bar elect the Council’s 
attorney members.201  As previously discussed, that has, in effect, been 
occurring for over forty years.202  The article recommends imposing 
ethical standards for the Council members,203 which it has already 
adopted in its bylaws.204  The article encourages increased transparency 
in the selection process.205  However, the Alaska process for holding 
judges accountable in retention elections, which the Finley article cor-
rectly recognizes as one of the most visible in the country,206 is the exact 
same process used when selecting judges.207  These so-called “reforms” 
of the judicial selection process are, therefore, already in place. 
The Finley article suggests giving the governor, the president pro-
tempore of the Senate, and the speaker of the House each an opportunity 
to appoint one non-attorney member of the Council.208  It is unclear how 
this would decrease the potential for political cronyism or undue influ-
ence since the majoritarian political influences in the House, Senate, and 
Governor’s mansion are currently and often occupied by members of the 
same political party.209 
Traditionally, tensions exist between judicial independence and ju-
dicial accountability.  The Finley article attempts to resolve this tension 
by offering suggestions to make the Council not “more” accountable but 
“differently” accountable.  All three non-attorney members are chosen 
by the governor and confirmed by the legislature.210  Once appointed, 
they do not serve at the pleasure of the governor but rather serve a des-
ignated six-year term.211  Having the non-attorney members appointed 
by a different political entity would not increase accountability of the 
Council but would merely shift political accountability to the legislature 
 
 199. Finley, supra note 1, at 71 (emphasis added). 
 200. Id. at 72. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See supra part III-B. 
 203. Finley, supra note 1, at 75. 
 204. See supra part IV-A. 
 205. Finley, supra note 1, at 75–76. 
 206. Id. at 76. 
 207. See FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 105, at 6–14 (evaluation crite-
ria for judicial appointments and evaluation standards for judicial retention). 
 208. Finley, supra note 1, at 75. 
 209. See State of Alaska, Official Election Results of the November 5, 2002 General 
Election, available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/02genr/data/results.htm 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2004). 
 210. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
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and would do nothing to increase the accountability of judges.  The gov-
ernor is properly accountable for his or her judicial appointments when 
up for re-election.212  The judges are themselves accountable in retention 
elections.213 
The judiciary should be accountable to ensure that judges are decid-
ing each case on its merits and not making decisions based on illegiti-
mate factors such as bias, personal politics, or improper influence.  Re-
tention elections in Alaska sufficiently provide for judicial 
accountability. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Finley article, focused on reforming Alaska’s merit selection 
system, conversely provides an opportunity to show that most of the au-
thor’s suggested reforms are already elements of the current system.  
The Council is responsive to the public’s need for judicial accountability 
through its extensive evaluation of the performance of judges standing 
for retention.  It gives the public many channels to participate in the 
work of nominating attorneys for judgeships.  The Council binds itself to 
the highest ethical standards and looks for similar standards in applicants 
for judgeships.  Alaska’s judiciary is considered one of the best in the 
country, showing that the legislature, governor, and Council are cooper-
ating to fully implement the system created by the framers of the Alaska 
Constitution. 
 
 212. See ALASKA CONST. art. III, §§ 3–5 (limiting a governor to no more than two 
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